In this commentary we review evidence concerning the true sensitivity of viewers to visual changes in scene images. We argue that the data strongly suggest that "change blindness" experiments, while revealing of a variety of important constraints on encoding and retrieval processes in visual memory, do not demonstrate the lack of scene representations assumed by O&N. Instead, the data suggest that detailed scene representations can be generated and survive relatively intact across views (e.g., across saccades) and over extended periods of time. Of course, as we have known at least since the seminal work of Sperling (1960) and Averbach and Coriell (1961) , these representations are not "iconic" in nature.
manipulations were investigated: deletions, type changes (replacement of an object with another object from a different basic-level category), token changes (replacement of an object with another object from the same basic-level category), and rotations 90° around the vertical axis. In each condition, change detection for previously attended objects was significantly above the (typically low) false alarm rate. Importantly, token changes and rotations were detected on a significant percentage of trials. These results suggest that relatively detailed visual information is represented and retained in visual memory as long as the object is fixated and thus attended before the change.
In these studies, changes were often missed when they first occurred, only to be detected later during viewing when the changed object happened to be refixated. In addition, participants often fixated many intervening scene regions over the course of a number of seconds between the target change and the first refixation of the (now changed) target, at which time they noticed the change. This phenomenon of delayed change detection suggests (a) that visual representations of objects are retained in memory over a relatively long period of time, (b) that these representations thus survive the withdrawal of attention, and (c) that refixation of a changed object serves as a strong retrieval cue to stored visual representations (see also Hollingworth, Schrock, & Henderson, 2001) .
Covert Change Detection. Though our results demonstrate that detailed visual representations can be generated and retained in visual memory, it is also clear that change detection in these experiments is not always perfect. One interpretation of these results might be that visual representations are not generated or retained some important proportion of the time. However, before accepting this conclusion, it is necessary to consider what can and cannot be inferred about visual representation from the results of change detection experiments that require overt response. The change blindness argument is typically of the following sort: If visual representations are retained, then mismatches between these representations and current input should be consciously reportable. But the problem with this argument is the implicit assumption that experience directly and completely reflects the nature of underlying representations and processes, an assumption we know to be wrong (Henderson & Hollingworth, in press ). This sort of assumption is deeply rooted in the argument put forth by O&N. We would argue that whereas perceptual experience is fair game as a scientific phenomenon to be explained, it should not provide the primary data upon which to base a scientific explanation.
We have observed that overt change detection (i.e., report of a change) significantly underestimates the extent to which visual information is retained in memory from previously attended objects. To examine covert (unreported and perhaps unconscious) effects of change, we have measured fixation time on target objects for the first entry of the eyes into the object region after the change, for those trials in which a change occurred but was not overtly reported, compared to the equivalent fixation time in a no-change control condition. Across multiple experiments, we have observed a large and robust elevation of fixation time for miss trials (Henderson & Hollingworth, 2000; Hollingworth & Henderson, in press; Hollingworth et al., in press ). These effects persist across many intervening fixations on other objects. Like the phenomenon of delayed overt detection, this latter effect suggests that representations preserving visual detail were retained in a relatively stable state over time. It seems that despite our failure to consciously notice or report changes, detection is nevertheless taking place within the visual system, indicating that the information needed to detect the change has been retained. Covert ("implicit") effects of scene and object changes have also been reported by Hayhoe et al. (1998), Fernandez-Duque and Thornton (2000) , and Williams and Simons (2000) . These effects raise serious doubts about the use of overt change detection as a measure of visual representation.
Forced-Choice Discrimination Experiments. We have also conducted experiments in which we directly tested memory for previously attended objects (Hollingworth & Henderson, in press ). In an online memory test, participants viewed scenes of real-world environments while their eye movements were monitored. The computer waited until the target object had been fixated at least once, then, during a saccade to an object on the other side of the scene, obscured the target via presentation of a salient mask. Because the appearance of the mask coincided with a saccade to a different object in the scene, the target object was not currently attended when the mask appeared. The appearance of the mask initiated a forcedchoice memory test. The distractor was either a different token from the same basic-level category (token discrimination) or identical to the target object except rotated 90 degrees in depth around the vertical axis (orientation discrimination). We found that both token and orientation discrimination were quite accurate, even when participants fixated multiple other objects in the scene between the last fixation on the target object prior to the onset of the mask, suggesting that representations of visual information are relatively stable over time. Similarly high levels of discrimination performance were observed when the test was delayed between 5 and 30 minutes after initial viewing. This latter evidence of accurate long term memory for the visual form of objects in scenes is consistent with evidence from the picture memory literature demonstrating very good memory for the visual form of whole scenes (Standing et al., 1970) and for the visual form of individual objects within scenes (Friedman, 1979; Parker, 1978) , and the similarity between discrimination performance in the online and long-term tests suggests that visual representations are quite stable.
Summary. Contrary to O&N's proposals based on change blindness, our data provide strong evidence that representations coding detailed visual information are generated and stored in a relatively stable form over time. What, then, causes people to miss changes? In our view, change detection failure, when it really happens, is due to failure of one of three basic memory processes: (a) the failure initially to encode visual information due to the failure to attend to (fixate) the critical scene region prior to the change, (b) the failure to encode the necessary visual information following the change, and (c) the failure to retrieve stored information when it is available. The critical point is that even when (a) is not a problem (the pre-change information is encoded, represented, and retained), problems with (b) and (c) can still lead to the failure to detect a change despite the presence of a detailed and stable representation. To our mind, concluding that there are no visual representations from the fact that viewers sometimes miss changes is logically equivalent to concluding that people have no memory system because they sometimes forget things. When measures are taken to ensure proper encoding and retrieval, change blindness is cured. Note Preparation of this commentary was supported by the National Science Foundation (SBR 9617274 and ECS 9873531).
